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IN THE UTAH COUKT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 970275-CA

JAMES REDD AND JEANNE REDD,

Priority No. 2

Defendants/Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THIS COURT MAY PROPERLY CONSIDER
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING COURT'S
ORAL RULING BECAUSE IT SUPPLEMENTS
AND CLARIFIES THE WRITTEN FINDINGS
Defendants argue repeatedly that this Court must strictly
limit itself to the preliminary hearing court's written findings
and order when it reviews the decision of the preliminary hearing
court to dismiss the information against them (Br. of App. at 23, 5, 10-11, 18-19, 20-21).

In support of this argument,

defendants rely on language from three cases, none of which fully
represent the current state of the relevant law.1

1

See State v.

All three of these cases, examined in their factual
contexts, stand for the single proposition that, where a trial
court's oral comments made prior to a final ruling conflict with
that ruling, the final ruling stands as the judgment of the
court. There is nothing controversial about this principle, nor
is there anything violative of it before the Court now.

1

Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah

97b); Newton v. State Rd. Comm'n.

463 P.2d 565 (Utah 1970); McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468
(Utah 1952).
In 1987, some nine years after the issuance of the most
recent case cited by defendants, rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure was materially amended.

In its current version,

the rule "now explicitly authorizes [the reviewing court] to look
beyond the written findings of fact to the trial record and
evaluate the sufficiency of the judge's oral findings . . .
rendered from the bench."

Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1058

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).2

Under

current law, a reviewing court is "not confined to the contents
of a particular document entitled ^Findings'; rather, the
findings may be expressed orally from the bench or contained in

Rule 52(a) now provides in pertinent part:
. . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. . . . It will be sufficient if
the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence. . . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This rule applies to criminal actions,
pursuant to rule 26(7) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
and rule 81(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State v.
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1986).
2

other documents. . . ." Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah
App. 1989); accord Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517 (Utah
App. 1989)("Rule 52 does not mandate the entry of signed, written
findings and conclusions.

On the contrary, the court may even

state its findings orally if it chooses")(emphasis omitted).

In

view of the underlying purpose of findings, which is to provide
"a detailed and logical factual basis for the ultimate decision"
for the parties themselves and for a reviewing court later called
upon to examine the propriety of the decision, the amended rule
52(a) makes good sense.

Hansen. 736 P.2d at 1058.

The case currently before the Court well illustrates the
reason for a comprehensive approach to findings.

Here, the

preliminary hearing court heard the evidence and then orally
announced its decision.

After finding probable cause to believe

that defendants had trespassed on state trust lands, the court
stated, "I also find probable cause to believe that [defendants]
did disturb these - or even disinterred these remains. . . . "
(State's Opening Br. at addendum C or R. 109). The court
followed this finding with an analysis of whether human remains
were intended to fall within the ambit of the statute
criminalizing abuse or desecration of a dead human body.

See id.

Towards the conclusion of its decision, the court reiterated its
finding in context, stating: "I am not going to bind over on the
felony charges, I will dismiss those charges and while indicating

3

as I have, my factual findings are that they did disinter these
remains.

And if that amounts to this offense, then this case

should be sent back for trial. . . ." (R. 111).
After the court completed its oral ruling, the following
colloquy occurred:
Court:

Defense
Counsel:

Court:

[Defense counsel], it will be
up to you and [co-counsel] to
prepare an Order putting into
- putting on paper the court's
decision here.
Any other findings, Judge, you
said that your findings is
[sic] that they did disinter?
Yes.

(R. 112).
The preliminary hearing court thus reiterated three times,
including once in direct response to an explicit question posed
by defense counsel, that it found probable cause to believe that
defendants had disinterred remains.

Notably, however, the

document entitled "Findings and Order" does not contain any
finding embodying the court's unequivocal ruling.

Instead, the

written findings drafted by defendants focus not on the
determination of probable cause to believe defendants disinterred
human remains at all, but rather on the peripheral distinction
between regulation of private and public lands (findings #3, 7,
8) and definitions of the terms "dead body" and "remains"
(findings # 4 , 5, 6). The single finding that relates at all to

4

the clear substance of the preliminary hearing court's central
ruling obliquely states:
2. The state presented evidence that
defendants, in the process of searching for
archeological artifacts, disturbed human
bones and bone fragments. The state has not
shown that the bones were in their original
place of repose before they were disturbed by
defendants.
State's Opening Br. at addendum B or R. 48.3
Defendants now seek to confine this Court to the written
ruling, arguing that the preliminary hearing court's oral finding
of probable cause is inconsistent with its written findings and
should, therefore, be ignored (Br. of App. at 2, 5, 11, 19).
Defendants' argument fails at the outset because it is based on a
faulty premise.
The oral ruling is not inconsistent with the written
finding.

Rather, it provides a necessary explanation for a vague

and incomplete written finding, drafted without the precise
language repeatedly articulated and specifically ordered by the

Defendants make much of the second sentence of this
finding, although the original place of repose was never even
discussed at the preliminary hearing. As to defendants'
contention that "there is no hint that bone fragments in the
instant case were ever buried," the evidence is to the contrary
(Br. of App. at 18. Indeed, evidence adduced at the preliminary
hearing included testimony that the digging was "very recent,"
that the bones appeared to have been dug "within a couple of
days," and that they were found "in close proximity to recentlyscreened dirt" (R. 87, 101, 103). A fair inference, properly
made based on record evidence, is that they came from the hole,
where they were buried. State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229
(Utah 1995).
5

finder of iacu.

See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neelv

Construction Co,, 677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984)("Where the
written findings are incomplete, inadequate, or ambiguous,. . .
they may be elaborated or interpreted (in respects not
inconsistent therewith) by reference to the trial court's written
memorandum or its oral explanation of the decision.")(citations
omitted).

Here, defendants' only relevant written finding

ambiguously states that the human bones and bone fragments "were
disturbed by defendants" (Id,).

Inquiring minds would logically

next ask how or in what way did defendants "disturb" these bones?
The unequivocal oral ruling provides the clear answer: defendants
disturbed the bones by disinterring them (R. 109, 111, 112).
Defendants' claim that this Court should confine itself to
the written ruling thus fails on at least two grounds: first,
rule 52(a) explicitly supports reference to oral findings; and,
second, the oral findings are not inconsistent with the written
ruling, but rather serve to clarify incomplete and vaguelydrafted written findings.

To ignore the oral ruling in this case

would be to strip the appellate process of meaning by ignoring
the clearly-articulated basis of the fact-finder's decision.

6

POINT TWO
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 76-9704, "DEAD HUMAN BODY" SHOULD BE
INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE THE HUMAN
REMAINS THAT DEFENDANTS DISINTERRED
FROM A RECOGNIZED ANASAZI BURIAL
SITE
Defendants argue that the term "dead human body" needs no
definition beyond its commonly understood meaning of a whole
corpse or complete entity and that, accordingly, the trial court
correctly determined that the bones in this case did not fall
within the ambit of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1996).4

To

illustrate why human bones should not be included within the
ambit of the broader term "dead human body" for purposes of
section 76-9-704, defendants rely on U.S. v. Shumway, 112 F.3d
1413 (10th Cir. 1997).

£££ Br. of App. at 7-10.

A careful look

at Shumway, however, reveals that, in fact, its rationale
supports the State's position.
Defendant's conviction in Shumway stemmed from his

4

Defendants assert that this Court must ignore the
preliminary hearing court's oral finding of probable cause to
believe that defendants disinterred human remains. At the same
time, they argue that the primary legal issue in the case is
whether the preliminary hearing court correctly found that the
term "dead human body" did not include the remains unearthed in
this case. However, if the preliminary hearing court's refusal
to bind defendants over for trial had been based on a finding of
no disinterment, as defendants assert, then the definition of
"dead human body" within the meaning of section 76-9-704 would
not even be relevant. Ironically, defendants devote much of
their brief to just this question. See Br. of App. at 6-7, 1215.

7

unautLoiized excavation of two Anasazi archaeological sites.5
In one instance, while digging at Dop-Ki Cave in Canyonlands
National Park, defendant unearthed the skeleton of an infant
wrapped in a burial blanket.

After a jury convicted defendant,

the trial court imposed sentence, enhancing the base offense
under the "vulnerable victim" provision of the federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which provided in pertinent part:
If the defendant knew or should
have known that a victim of the
offense was unusually vulnerable
due to age, physical or mental
condition, or that a victim was
otherwise particularly susceptible
to the criminal conduct, increase
by 2 levels.
Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1422 (citing United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 3Al.l(b) (1995)).

The question presented on

appeal was "whether the human skeleton of an Anasazi infant is a
^vulnerable victim'" within the meaning of the Sentencing
Guidelines.

Id.

In holding that no dead body could constitute a

"vulnerable victim," the Tenth Circuit highlighted the
impracticability in any case of drawing a line between a complete
human skeleton and less intact remains: if a human skeleton
qualified as a vulnerable victim, so, too, would "a pile of

5

Of relevance here, defendant was charged with violations
of the federal Archaeological Resources Protection Act
("A.R.P.A."), a civil regulatory statute comparable to Utah's
Antiquities Act, and with damaging United States property.
Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1417 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2, and 18 U.S.C. § 1361).
8

cremated remains, or a pile of dirt that was once a pile of
bones."

Id, at 1423.

Emphasizing the policy underlying the

"vulnerable victim" provision —
victims —

that is, the protection of crime

the court held that once death occurred, the deceased

could no longer be characterized as a "vulnerable victim" for
sentencing enhancement purposes.
Defendants use the federal court's language to argue that
the term "dead human body" within the context of section 76-9-704
must be

interpreted to mean only a whole corpse or a complete

entity because, based on the logic of Shumwav, any line-drawing
is impractical and will lead to illogical outcomes.

See Br. of

App. at 7-10, 13.
A close reading of Shumwav, however, reveals that its
reasoning cannot be superimposed on this case.

At the outset,

while the Tenth Circuit drew a bright line between life and death
for purposes of the "vulnerable victim" enhancement, the line
must obviously be drawn sometime after death for a statute aimed
at abuse or desecration of the dead.

Thus, the line-drawing

problem so neatly resolved in Shumwav cannot be so easily
resolved in this case. And, to limit the state statute's
application to conduct committed against complete corpses
unnecessarily narrows the reach of the statute in light of its
history and purposes without providing any useful resolution to

9

the line-dr&v/jne, quandary recognized in Shumwav.6
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit left open the possibility of
applying a sentencing enhancement to a victim who had died if
that enhancment, unlike the "vulnerable victim" provision,
focused on the conduct of the offender rather than on the
characteristics of the victim.

Shumwav. 112 F.3d at 1424 (citing

United States v. Ouintero, 21 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994) (where
district court upheld increase in sentence because defendant's
conduct after child's death constituted "extreme conduct" for
purposes of relevant sentencing enhancement provision)).

The

Tenth Circuit recogized the importance of analyzing the purpose
of the enhancement provision in order to determine how it should
be interpreted.

Thus, the Shumway court concluded that its

"holding here is not intended to limit the application of
provisions . . . which focus on the offender's conduct."

Id.

Section 76-9-704 plainly focuses on the conduct of the
offender.

Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are phrased in terms of

a person who "removes," "conceals," "fails to report,"
"destroys," or "disinters." While the object of the criminal
conduct remains constant throughout, the statute focuses on the
6

Defendants' definition of "dead human body" creates
insurmountable line-drawing problems of its own. For example,
must the body be covered by flesh to come within the statutory
definition? Would the intact skeleton that defendant disinterred
in the Shumwav case qualify? What about a Euroamerican pioneer
whose remains are unearthed from an isolated and primitive desert
gravesite?
10

variety of unlawful and intentional acts that will classify an
offender within section 76-9-704. This difference alone,
according to the Tenth Circuit, can compel a different outcome.
Further, unlike this case, Shumway involved a sentencing
enhancement provision that became relevant only after defendant
was convicted of violating the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act.

Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's decision hinged in

part on the fact that "better means exist to deter the loathsome
conduct of grave robbers than to drain the term ^vulnerable
victim' of any reasonable meaning."

Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1423

n.4.
The statute at issue in this case represents the sort of
"better means" alluded to by the Tenth Circuit.

Section 76-9-

704(1)(a) and (b) were originally enacted to ensure the sanctity
of the dead by criminalizing the acts of grave robbers who
disinterred the dead for pecuniary gain.
at 12-17.

See State's Opening Br.

From a policy standpoint, it makes good sense to

charge grave robbers under a criminal statute aimed directly at
grave robbing rather than to indirectly attack the problem by
charging them under a purely regulatory statute, such as
A.R.P.A., and then seeking to enhance their sentences by
straining the definition of "vulnerable victim."
Finally, in this case, the definition of "dead human body"
need not be strained.

Defendants assert that a single, narrow

11

definition of "dead human body" must apply to the entire statute,
regardless of its purposes.

For this proposition, they argue

that it is absurd to suggest that, under section (1)(d), one
could "commit or attempt to commit . . . sexual intercourse" on a
human remain, as opposed to a complete corpse.
at 15-16.

See Br. of App.

Defendants fail to recognize, however, that section

76-9-704 was enacted piecemeal, with different sections added at
different times and for different purposes.

Section (1)(d), for

example, was enacted some ninety years after the original
versions of sections (1)(a) and (1)(b) and for quite different
reasons.

See State's Opening Brief at 15-17.

The State's

broadly-based definition of "dead human body" would honor the
divergent purposes of section 76-9-704 by encompassing intact
bodies as well as recognizable human remains.

Thus, the behavior

prohibited by section (1)(d) might involve a substantially intact
body, while the behavior prohibited by sections (1)(a) and
(1)(b), the grave-robbing provisions, could involve human
remains.7

Such an approach would take into account and fulfill

the disparate purposes of all three sections.

7

Contrary to defendants' emotional contention,
unintentionally disinterring human remains would not subject the
innocent bean farmer, church-goer, picnicker, or hiker to
criminal sanctions under section 76-9-704. See Br. of App. at 89. The law unequivocally requires that the conduct be
intentional. In contrast, one who intentionally or knowingly
disinterred human remains from an identifiable burial site would
be culpable.

12

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated both in the State's opening brief ar^
in this reply brief, this Court should vacate the order of
dismissal issued by the preliminary hearing court, reinstate the
felony information, and order that defendants be bound over to
district court to stand trial for abuse or desecration of a dead
human body, a third degree, felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-704.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j|^ day of November, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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